18-3004 Amarasinghe v. Barr BIA Segal, IJ A088 833 135 A093 444 459 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 23rd day of October, two thousand twenty. PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ PATHIRANAGE DON DARSHANA RU AMARASINGHE, SAROJA NILUKSHI KURUNERU, Petitioners, v. 18-3004 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONERS: Pathiranage Don Darshana Ru Amarasinghe; Saroja Nilukshi Kuruneru, pro se, Staten Island, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Nancy E. Friedman, Senior Litigation Counsel; Brooke Marie Maurer, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the petition for review is DISMISSED. Petitioners Pathiranage Don Darshana Ru Amarasinghe and Saroja Nilukshi Kuruneru, natives and citizens of Sri Lanka, seek review of a BIA decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their application for cancellation of removal. In re Pathiranage Don Darshana Ru Amarasinghe, Saroja Nilukshi Kuruneru, Nos. A088 833 135, A093 444 459 (B.I.A. Sept. 27, 2018), aff’g Nos. A088 833 135, A093 444 459 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 29, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. 2 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA and address only the dispositive hardship determination. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). Noncitizens, such as Petitioners, who are not permanent residents may have their removal cancelled if they meet presence and character requirements and they “establish[] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [their] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The hardship to a qualifying relative “must be substantially beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves this country.” In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62 (BIA 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of cancellation of removal based on an applicant’s failure to ...
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