NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 6 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BELINDA RODRIGUES; FRAZIER No. 20-70143 ATAIDE, Agency Nos. A089-703-441 Petitioners, A089-703-442 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted October 21, 2021 San Francisco, California Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and WALLACE and BEA, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Belinda Rodrigues is a native and citizen of India.1 Rodrigues petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision to dismiss her appeal and affirm an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying her * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1 Petitioner Frazier Ataide is a derivative beneficiary on Rodrigues’s asylum application. Like the parties, we refer only to Rodrigues in this memorandum disposition. claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) on the basis that she suffered and will suffer persecution on account of her religion or political opinion. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we grant and remand the petition to the BIA for a renewed credibility determination. “We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence.” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 2020). The substantial-evidence standard is “extremely deferential,” Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Monjaraz–Munoz v. INS, 327 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2003)), and we “must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion,” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). “In reviewing an adverse credibility determination, we consider the ‘reasons explicitly identified by the BIA’” and “the reasoning articulated in the IJ’s . . . decision in support of those reasons.” Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 925 (quoting Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2014)). Even under this extremely deferential standard, we do not “accept blindly an IJ’s conclusion that a petitioner is not credible.” Giu v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Osorio v. INS, 99 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1996)). The REAL ID Act’s requirement that inconsistencies “be considered in light of the ‘totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors’ indicates that the agency has a duty to 2 consider a ‘petitioner’s explanation for a perceived inconsistency and other record evidence that sheds light on whether there is in fact an inconsistency at all.’” Munyuh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 750, 758 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1043, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010)). If the agency’s decision “cannot be sustained upon its reasoning,” then “we must remand to allow the agency to decide any issues remaining in the case.” Id. (quoting Solorio-Ruiz v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2018)). 1. Substantial evidence does not support the agency’s adverse credibility determination. Rodrigues provided …
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