Carla Melgar-Melgar v. Jeffrey Rosen

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 12 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CARLA PATRICIA MELGAR-MELGAR, No. 18-72268 Petitioner, Agency No. A208-283-595 v. MEMORANDUM* JEFFREY A. ROSEN, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted December 7, 2020** Pasadena, California Before: KELLY,*** GOULD, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges. Carla Patricia Melgar-Melgar (“Melgar”), citizen and native of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of her * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection from removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and denial of her motion to remand.1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the case, we do not recite them here. When the BIA conducts its own review rather than adopting the IJ’s decision, we review the BIA’s decision “except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” See Perez-Mejia v. Holder, 663 F.3d 403, 409 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Further, the agency’s factual determinations are conclusive unless “the evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels it . . .” INS v. Elias- Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992) (emphasis in original); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We have described the standard of review of questions of fact as “extremely deferential.” Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 902 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). This standard does not allow us to reverse the BIA’s decision simply if we disagree with the agency’s factual evaluation. Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2007). The INA defines a “refugee” as a person unable to return to his country of nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 1 Melgar has failed to address the denial of her claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture in any way in her Opening Brief or Reply Brief to this Court, or in her appeal to the BIA. For this reason, her CAT claim is abandoned, and we do not address it further. Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1125 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015). 2 of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), the Attorney General must withhold removal of an alien if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social ...

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