Carlos Campas-Burgueno v. Merrick Garland

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 3 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CARLOS ARMANDO CAMPAS- No. 17-71672 BURGUENO, AKA CARLOS ARMANDO CAMPAS, Agency No. A205-931-001 Petitioner, MEMORANDUM* v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 20, 2021** San Francisco, California Before: BADE and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BERMAN,*** District Judge. Petitioner Carlos Armando Campas-Burgueno, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Richard M. Berman, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 1 his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his applications for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part. Where, as here, the BIA “conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather than adopting the IJ’s decision, our ‘review is limited to the BIA’s decision.’” Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006)). “[W]e review de novo the BIA’s determinations of questions of law and its legal conclusions.” Id. 1. With respect to cancellation of removal, we dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction because Campas-Burgueno failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The IJ denied cancellation of removal on the grounds that Campas- Burgueno abandoned his application by failing to file by the IJ’s deadline. The IJ held, alternatively, that Campas-Burgueno was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. In his appeal to the BIA, Campas-Burgueno contested his statutory eligibility. He failed to challenge the IJ’s (dispositive) determination that he had abandoned his cancellation of removal application. Campas-Burgueno has conceded that he “did not challenge the IJ’s finding that he had abandoned his application for cancellation.” He unconvincingly contends that this issue was nevertheless exhausted because he “challenged the overarching issue of his eligibility for [c]ancellation [of removal].” We may review 2 a final order of removal if the petitioner has exhausted all administrative remedies available. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). “A petitioner cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement by making a general challenge to the IJ’s decision, but, rather, must specify which issues form the basis of the appeal.” Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 2004). Simply stated, “[f]ailure to raise an issue in an appeal to the BIA constitutes a failure to exhaust remedies with respect to that question and deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter.” Vargas v. INS, 831 F.2d 906, 907–08 (9th Cir. 1987). 2. With respect to voluntary …

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