Christian Munoz-Mejia v. Merrick Garland


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 14 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CHRISTIAN MOISES MUNOZ-MEJIA, No. 20-72598 Petitioner, Agency No. A088-523-512 v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney MEMORANDUM* General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the Department of Homeland Security Submitted June 10, 2021** Seattle, Washington Before: GILMAN,*** GOULD, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. Christian Moises Munoz-Mejia, a native and citizen of Honduras, first entered the United States without authorization in August 2007 and was removed * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. to Honduras four months later. Munoz-Mejia then illegally reentered the United States in March 2012 and, in July 2020, the Department of Homeland Security reinstated its prior order of removal. He now petitions for review of an immigration judge’s (IJ’s) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that Munoz- Mejia did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Honduras and thus is not entitled to relief from the reinstated removal order. Substantial evidence and controlling caselaw support the IJ’s determination that Munoz-Mejia failed to establish a reasonable possibility of persecution in Honduras on account of a protected ground. See Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that the petitioner failed to establish that harm would occur on “account of” one of the five protected grounds). Munoz- Mejia alleges two protected grounds: religion and membership in the group defined as “young Honduran males who resist gang recruitment.” As for religion, the record does not support Munoz-Mejia’s argument that he has demonstrated a reasonable possibility of persecution because of his Christian faith. Although members of a gang insulted Munoz-Mejia’s faith, they did so only after they asked him to join them. The gang members, moreover, did not ever harm or threaten to harm Munoz-Mejia. As to Munoz-Mejia’s broadly defined social group, “[a]n alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang 2 20-72598 members bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “young men in El Salvador resisting gang violence” did not constitute a social group because the group was too loosely defined to meet the particularity requirement and because it lacked social visibility), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Munoz-Mejia attempts to differentiate his case from controlling caselaw by arguing that the gangs in his case were particularly “persisten[t]” in their desire to recruit him. Such an observation, however, is immaterial …

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