RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 22a0171p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ CHRISTOPHER ALAN MITCHELL, │ Petitioner-Appellant, │ │ v. > No. 20-6031 │ │ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │ Respondent-Appellee. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Greeneville. Nos. 2:09-cr-00017-1; 2:14-cv-00183—J. Ronnie Greer, District Judge. Argued: April 28, 2022 Decided and Filed: August 5, 2022 Before: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and READLER, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Erin P. Rust, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Erin P. Rust, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. _________________ OPINION _________________ CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Almost a decade ago, inmate Christopher Alan Mitchell moved to vacate his sentence on the ground that he had been erroneously designated as a career offender under the Armed Career Criminal Act. At first, Mitchell’s efforts bore fruit. No. 20-6031 Mitchell v. United States Page 2 Relying on then-existing law, the district court granted Mitchell’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, vacated his sentence, and set the case for resentencing. The resentencing process began but, before it was completed, developments in other cases revealed that Mitchell was a career offender after all. So the court vacated the order granting relief, denied Mitchell’s § 2255 motion, and reinstated the original sentence. Notwithstanding the denial of his § 2255 motion, Mitchell claims that the district court enjoyed the discretion to resentence him de novo. We disagree. After finding Mitchell ineligible for § 2255 relief, the court was required to reinstate his original sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We also decline Mitchell’s request to expand his certificate of appealability. I. This case involves two mainstays of our docket: postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and the Armed Career Criminal Act. Beginning with the latter, the Armed Career Criminal Act imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence where a defendant possesses a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has at least three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The phrase “violent felony” includes “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . is burglary.” § 924(e)(2)(B). Over a decade ago, Mitchell pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of § 922(g). He also had three prior convictions relevant here: two for Tennessee aggravated burglary in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403 and one for Class D Tennessee burglary in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402. Under then-controlling Sixth Circuit precedent, Tennessee aggravated burglary was a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882, …
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