Franciszek Bystron v. Attorney General United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT __________ Nos. 20-2971 & 21-1807 __________ FRANCISZEK KRASZTOF BYSTRON, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA __________ On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A097-615-784) Immigration Judge: Edward R. Grant __________ Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) On May 20, 2022 __________ Before: McKEE, JORDAN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges (Filed: May 24, 2022) __________ OPINION __________  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. McKEE, Circuit Judge. Franciszek Bystron filed two petitions to review Board of Immigration Appeals’ decisions. Bystron’s first petition (No. 20-2971) seeks review of a final order of removal denying his application for adjustment of status and waiver of inadmissibility. He argues the BIA erred in its assessment of his claim of extreme hardship. Bystron’s second peti- tion (No. 21-1807) is for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen the proceed- ings in light of evidence that he claims was previously unavailable. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss both petitions for review. I. The proceedings relevant to Bystron’s first petition, No. 20-2971, were initiated after his conviction for bank fraud. Pet. Br. 1, 7, 10, 12; Resp. Br. 14. The government argues we must dismiss the petition because we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary decision to deny waivers of inadmissibility, Resp. Br. 2, 11, 13, and be- cause Bystron was convicted of an aggravated felony, id. at 2, 20. Bystron can only return to the United States if granted a waiver of inadmissibility. The BIA agreed with the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that Bystron did not meet his burden of demonstrating that his wife or children would suffer extreme hardship, particu- larly given the numerous family and friends in Poland who could aid the family’s 2 transition to Poland. R. at 18-19; Pet. Br. 5; Resp. Br. 11. We lack jurisdiction to re- view the BIA’s factual and discretionary denial of Bystron’s claim of extreme hardship.1 We have routinely recognized our lack of jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discre- tionary determinations, including rulings on requests for waivers of inadmissibility.2 Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) expressly precludes our review of the denial of a waiver of inadmissibility.3 In addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) precludes our review of any final order of removal of a noncitizen who has committed an aggravated felony.4 Since Bystron’s bank fraud conviction is an aggravated felony, he is removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and we may not review the BIA’s removal order.5 1 See Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur jurisdiction does not extend to an agency’s factual and discretionary determinations underlying the denial of waivers based on an analysis involving extreme hardship.”). 2 See Chiao Fang Ku v. Att’y Gen., 912 F.3d 133, 144 (3d Cir. 2019). 3 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . …

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