NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________ Nos. 19-1703, 19-1704 _______________ FRANKLIN OMAR LOPEZ-SANTOS, EDWIN JAIVER LOPEZ SANTOS, Petitioners v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _______________ On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency Nos. A098-964-936, 088-367-049) Immigration Judge: John P. Ellington _______________ Argued: March 10, 2020 Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges (Opinion Filed: September 30, 2020) _______________ Bridget Cambria Cambria & Kline 532 Walnut Street Reading PA, 19601 Robert Jackel [ARGUED] Suite 360 399 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19106 Counsel for Petitioners 1 Margot L. Carter Corey L. Farrell [ARGUED] United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation P.O. Box 878 Ben Franklin Stations Washington, DC 20044 Counsel for Respondent _______________ OPINION* _______________ McKee, Circuit Judge. In this consolidated immigration appeal, Franklin and Edwin Lopez-Santos, brothers and natives of Honduras, petition for review of the BIA’s denial of their applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Government has conceded that the BIA improperly applied Myrie v. Attorney General1 as to Franklin’s CAT claim and asks for that claim to be remanded for review under the proper standard.2 We agree and will remand for the BIA to reconsider Franklin’s CAT claim under a de novo standard of review instead of the clear error standard used. As to Franklin’s withholding from removal claim and Edwin’s * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 855 F.3d 509, 515-16 (3d Cir. 2017). 2 Appellee Br. at 36 n. 8; accord Appellants’ Op. Br. at 47-48. 2 withholding and CAT claims, we will affirm and must dismiss Franklin’s petition for review in part, and Edwin’s in total.3 I. Where, as here, the BIA adopted the reasoning of the IJ in its decision, we review the factual determinations in both decisions for substantial evidence. 4 We reverse only if a reasonable factfinder would be “compelled to conclude otherwise.”5 We review de novo any legal conclusions.6 Edwin claims that the BIA erred in determining he was not entitled to withholding of relief.7 He argues the BIA reached this incorrect conclusion by relying on the IJ’s incomplete review of the record, excluding certain corroborating affidavits from family members, thereby improperly determining that the Honduran government would be able to protect him despite evidence of his cousin’s brutal torture and murder. Though we acknowledge the tragic events surrounding his cousin’s death, Edwin gives insufficient weight to the adverse credibility determination reached by the IJ and affirmed in the BIA’s thorough opinion.8 But setting that determination aside, as the IJ and BIA did in 3 The BIA had appellate jurisdiction of the IJ’s decisions under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). We have jurisdiction over the BIA’s order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 4 Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010). 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 ...
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