18-3387-ag Guaman-Talledo v. Barr UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 7th day of April, two thousand twenty. PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, MICHAEL H. PARK, Circuit Judges. FRANK MARLON GUAMAN-TALLEDO, Petitioner, 18-3387-ag v. WILLIAM P. BARR, United States Attorney General, Respondent. FOR PETITIONER: Mary Foden, De Castro Foden, LLC, Hartford, CT. FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director; Jenny C. Lee, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of the October 10, 2018 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Frank Marlon Guaman-Talledo (“Guaman-Talledo”), a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of an October 10, 2018, decision of the BIA denying his motion to remand and affirming an October 10, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Guaman- Talledo’s applications for adjustment of status with a waiver of inadmissibility, cancellation of removal for certain non-permanent residents, and voluntary departure. In re Frank Marlon Guaman- Talledo, No. A 203 293 692 (B.I.A. Oct. 10, 2018), aff’g No. A 203 293 692 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Oct. 10, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. Guaman-Talledo challenges the BIA’s decision to the extent it declined to remand for consideration of additional evidence of the hardship his removal would cause to his U.S. citizen children. He argues that the BIA abused its discretion and provided insufficient explanation to allow meaningful appellate review of that exercise of discretion. We find his arguments without merit. “A motion to remand that relies on newly available evidence is held to the substantive requirements of a motion to reopen,” and we review the denial of such a motion for abuse of discretion. Li Yong Cao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2005). Failure to provide new, material evidence is a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104–05 (1988). In the context of discretionary forms ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals