UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 17-2287 HECTOR REYMUNDO HENRIQUEZ DIMAS, Petitioner, v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Argued: September 25, 2018 Decided: October 18, 2018 Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Petition for review granted and remanded for further proceedings by unpublished opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Thacker concurred. ARGUED: Elana Nightingale Dawson, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Lindsay Corliss, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Eric Harris Singer, LAW OFFICE OF ERIC SINGER, LLC, Bethesda, Maryland; Adam J. Tuetken, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, John S. Hogan, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 DUNCAN, Circuit Judge: After pleading guilty to second-degree assault and a fourth-degree sexual offense, Hector Henriquez Dimas (“Henriquez”)--a native of El Salvador who entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2011--was subjected to removal proceedings. The basis for Henriquez’s removal, according to the Department of Homeland Security (the “DHS”), was that the relevant fourth-degree sexual offense is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). The immigration judge (the “IJ”) agreed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) affirmed, issuing its own opinion as to why the offense constitutes a CIMT. For the reasons that follow, the BIA’s ruling was erroneous, and we therefore grant Henriquez’s petition for review, vacate the order of removal, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. In April 2016, Henriquez was arrested on second-degree rape charges after it was reported that Henriquez, who was twenty years old at the time, had sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old. Henriquez subsequently pleaded guilty to second-degree assault and a fourth-degree sexual offense--specifically, “sexual contact with another without the consent of the other.” Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-308(b)(1) (“Section 3-308(b)(1)”). The DHS sought Henriquez’s removal from the United States as an alien convicted of a 3 CIMT under the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”) in February 2017. 1 Henriquez challenged, inter alia, whether his conviction of a fourth-degree sexual offense qualifies as a CIMT. The IJ determined that it does and ordered him removed, reasoning that pursuant to In re Jimenez-Cedillo, Henriquez’s conviction is a CIMT because “the subsection at issue[,] . . . sex offense in the fourth degree in this case, does not differ materially from the subsection at issue in sex offense in the third degree at issue in Jimenez-Cedillo.” J.A. 280 (citing In re Jimenez-Cedillo, 27 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2017)). Henriquez appealed, and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s removal order. In its opinion, the BIA also relied on In re Jimenez-Cedillo for the principle that “offenses that necessarily involve sexual contact with a victim ...
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