Marcos Rios-Rios v. William P. Barr

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 19a0506n.06 Case No. 18-4208 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Oct 09, 2019 MARCOS RIOS-RIOS, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) Petitioner, ) ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW v. ) FROM THE UNITED STATES ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, ) APPEALS ) Respondent. ) BEFORE: SUTTON, COOK, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges. COOK, Circuit Judge. An immigration judge granted Marcos Rios-Rios a cancellation of removal, but the Board of Immigration Appeals vacated the IJ’s order. Rios-Rios petitions for review of the Board’s decision. We dismiss in part and deny in part his petition. I. Rios-Rios, a native and citizen of Mexico, illegally entered the United States in 2003. Since then, he has lived in Michigan with his wife and three U.S. citizen children. In 2014, the government instituted removal proceedings against him. Despite finding Rios-Rios eligible for removal, the IJ granted him a discretionary cancellation of removal, citing the children’s financial dependence on their father and other factors. The Board, however, saw things differently. It reweighed the facts and found Rios-Rios ineligible for relief, vacating the IJ’s order. Case No. 18-4208, Rios-Rios v. Barr II. When the Board “does not summarily affirm or adopt the IJ’s reasoning and provide[s] an explanation for its decision, we review the [Board’s] decision as the final agency determination.” Fang Huang v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 640, 651 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We treat the Board’s factual findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Thap v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 674, 676 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). We uphold the Board’s decision “if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Koliada v. INS, 259 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). III. In general, the government can deport a noncitizen unlawfully in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). But the Board—acting for the Attorney General—can relieve qualifying noncitizens from deportation through cancellation of removal. See id. § 1229b(b). The Board held that Rios-Rios failed to qualify for cancellation relief because his removal would not cause his children “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” a necessary showing here. See id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Rios-Rios challenges that decision on two grounds: (1) the Board misapplied its own precedent; and (2) the Board improperly failed to accept the IJ’s factual findings. We take each in turn, finding both unavailing. A broad jurisdictional bar limits our review in this area: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) precludes courts from reviewing denials of cancellation relief and other decisions left to the Attorney General’s discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)–(ii); Aburto–Rocha v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 500, 502 (6th Cir. 2008). But the jurisdictional bar admits of a few narrow exceptions, and Rios- Rios attempts to position his arguments among them. We retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims, questions of law, and “non-discretionary decisions.” 8 U.S.C. -2- Case No. ...

Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals