Mohamed Kamara v. Attorney General United States


NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________ No. 21-1188 _____________ MOHAMED KAMARA, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ________________ On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A075-059-694) Immigration Judge: Kuyomars Q. Golparvar ______________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) November 16, 2021 _____________ Before: CHAGARES, BIBAS, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: November 24, 2021) ____________ OPINION* _____________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. Mohamed Kamara petitions this Court to reverse the denial of his application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (the “CAT”) by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA,” and collectively with the IJ, the “agency”). Because the agency’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, we will deny the petition. I. Kamara is a citizen of Sierra Leone who came to the United States as a refugee when he was eight years old. Kamara never became a lawful permanent resident and remained in refugee status. The Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings against Kamara, alleging that he was removable on the basis of certain criminal convictions. Kamara applied for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture.1 He asserted that he likely will be imprisoned upon return to Sierra Leone and that the inhumane prison conditions there constitute torture under the CAT.2 The IJ denied relief and the BIA affirmed. 1 Kamara applied to adjust status under 8 U.S.C. § 1159. The IJ pretermitted this application, finding that it was precluded by Kamara’s drug trafficking conviction. Kamara also claimed derivative United States citizenship through his mother, but the IJ concluded that because Kamara never adjusted to permanent resident status before his eighteenth birthday, he could not derive citizenship based on the applicable law when his mother naturalized in 2005. Kamara does not challenge either of these holdings on appeal. 2 Kamara also asserted a fear of return based on his uncle’s military activity. Kamara did not appeal the IJ’s denial of CAT protection on that basis. 2 II.3 In evaluating claims under the CAT, Immigration Judges must use the well- established framework from Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 516 (3d Cir. 2017). At the outset of this analysis, IJs answer a factual question: “what is likely to happen to the [noncitizen] if removed[?]” Id. Here, the IJ found that Kamara was not likely to be imprisoned upon return to Sierra Leone and the BIA adopted that finding. We review that factual determination for substantial evidence. See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020). Under that standard, the agency’s “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Kamara asserts that he is likely to be imprisoned upon return to Sierra Leone due to the country’s common practice of detaining deportees with …

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