19-2519 Quarshie v. Garland UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 26th day of September, two thousand twenty-two. Present: REENA RAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY WILLIAM J. NARDINI Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ RITA MANSAH QUARSHIE, Petitioner, v. 19-2519-ag MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ For Petitioner: EDWARD J. CUCCIA, Edward J. Cuccia, PC, New York, NY For Respondent: MADELINE HENLEY, Trial Attorney (Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation Counsel, on the brief), for Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Rita Mansah Quarshie, a native and citizen of Ghana, seeks review of a July 18, 2019, decision of the BIA affirming a January 18, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Rita Mansah Quarshie, No. A 096 569 930 (B.I.A. July 18, 2019), aff’g No. A 096 569 930 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Jan. 18, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the case. We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). Quarshie challenges only the agency’s determination that she was competent during her removal proceedings. We review factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014). Accordingly, we review the agency’s factual determination of competency for substantial evidence. See Diop v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 70, 75 (4th Cir. 2015); see also, e.g., Moscoso-Mancia v. Garland, No. 20-3839, 2022 WL 2840030, at *1 (2d Cir. July 21, 2022) (citing Diop v. Lynch, 807 F.3d at 75). “[A]n alien is presumed to be competent to participate in removal proceedings,” and, “[a]bsent indicia of mental incompetency, an [IJ] is under no obligation to analyze an alien’s competency.” Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 477 (B.I.A. 2011). “[T]he test for determining whether an alien is competent to participate in immigration proceedings is whether he or she has a rational and …
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