Ramon Jauregui-Garcia v. Merrick Garland


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 14 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS RAMON JAUREGUI-GARCIA, No. 20-16871 Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00876-JAT-JFM v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK GARLAND, et al., Respondents-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 8, 2021** Pasadena, California Before: MURGUIA and BADE, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,*** District Judge. Ramon Angel Jauregui-Garcia, a citizen and native of Mexico, petitions for review of the district court’s dismissal of his habeas petition as moot after he challenged the conditions of his confinement and an Immigration Judge released him * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation. 1 on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss the petition as moot. Zegarra-Gomez v. INS, 314 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm. 1. “[A] case becomes moot when it no longer present[s] a case or controversy under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution.” Abdala v. INS, 488 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Release from confinement does not automatically moot a habeas petition so long as there remains some “collateral consequence that may be redressed by success on the petition.” Id. at 1064 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). No such consequence exists here. Although the discretionary redetainment provisions of § 1226(a) raise the possibility that Jauregui-Garcia may be redetained in the future, this possibility does not prolong a live case or controversy because, unlike the recognized collateral consequence in Zegarra-Gomez, redetainment under § 1226(a) may never come to fruition. See 314 F.3d at 1127. 2. A case is also moot “when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 161 (2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the dispositive fact is that Jauregui-Garcia did not challenge the government’s authority to confine him but instead challenged the confinement conditions. This fact distinguishes Jauregui-Garcia from the petitioners in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), and Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010). Unlike those 2 petitioners, Jauregui-Garcia does not argue that the government lacked authority to detain him, nor does he argue that he was deprived of the opportunity to challenge the justification of his detention. Rather, he seems to be in the “far different situation” the Court envisioned in Rodriguez, where it implied no case or controversy would exist. See 591 F.3d at 1117 (explaining that if petitioner had received a hearing …

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