Rengqiang Yu v. Merrick Garland


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 24 2021 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS RENGQIANG YU, AKA Yu Reng Qiang No. 19-73102 Petitioner, Agency No. A209-435-467 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted February 1, 2021** Honolulu, Hawaii Before: CLIFTON, R. NELSON, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Rengqiang Yu, a citizen and native of China, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the order of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“Torture Convention”). We have jurisdiction under § 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1252. While we review legal questions de novo, * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, Hamazaspyan v. Holder, 590 F.3d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 2009), meaning that those findings must be upheld unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petition. Yu’s requests for relief from removal rested on his claims that he had been arrested, detained, interrogated, and beaten on two separate occasions in China for practicing his Christian religion in house meetings of church members. The IJ concluded that Yu was not credible, but that, even if his testimony were accepted, he did not establish his eligibility for any form of relief. Although the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision pursuant to Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), the BIA’s decision qualified that adoption by also stating that (1) in upholding the adverse credibility determination, the BIA relied on only the factors discussed in the BIA’s decision and not on “the remaining factors” mentioned by the IJ; and (2) the BIA did not reach or rely upon the alternative grounds provided by the IJ. Accordingly, we construe the BIA’s decision as adopting the IJ’s decision only to the extent that it denied relief based on the adverse credibility determination and then only with respect to the credibility factors the BIA discussed. Thus construed, the agency’s credibility ruling relied upon five “specific and cogent reasons,” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010), that are supported by substantial evidence. 2 First, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Yu’s credibility was undercut by inconsistencies between the notes of Yu’s Border Patrol interview and his later testimony—particularly his statements, in the initial interview, that he had come to the United States to seek employment and that he had never been arrested before. Yu argues that the Border Patrol notes should have been discounted as unreliable, but we conclude …

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