Tomas Sanchez Popoca v. Merrick Garland


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 20 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT TOMAS SANCHEZ POPOCA, No. 20-72653 Petitioner, Agency No. A092-687-341 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted November 15, 2021 Pasadena, California Before: BERZON and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,** District Judge. Tomas Sanchez Popoca, a citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his applications for withholding of removal and for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation. deny Sanchez Popoca’s petition for review. 1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Sanchez Popoca committed a particularly serious crime and so is ineligible for withholding of removal. Withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and CAT is unavailable to a noncitizen if he or she, “having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime[,] is a danger to the community of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2). “The applicable legal standard to determine if a crime is particularly serious, described in the BIA’s decision in Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1982), requires the agency to ask whether ‘the nature of the conviction, the underlying facts and circumstances and the sentence imposed justify the presumption that the convicted immigrant is a danger to the community.’” Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). In reviewing a particularly serious crime determination, this Court “is limited to ensuring that the agency relied on the ‘appropriate factors’ and ‘[]proper evidence’ to reach [its] conclusion.” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 2010)). When analyzing Sanchez Popoca’s felony conviction for drunk driving with priors, the IJ correctly analyzed each of the three factors required by Matter of 2 Frentescu, and the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. First, the IJ assessed the “nature of the conviction,” explaining that drunk driving is “an inherently dangerous activity” because it “has the potential for great harm to the driver and all others encountered.” The IJ then explained that Sanchez Popoca’s conviction resulted in a suspended two-year prison sentence, that he was placed on probation—a condition of which was serving 730 days in county jail—and that he ultimately served seven months in custody. Last, the IJ considered the facts and circumstances underlying Sanchez Popoca’s DUI conviction, specifically that the record indicated Sanchez Popoca’s drunk driving conviction occurred while his license was already suspended because of a prior …

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