18-2891 Ullah v. Barr UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 26th day of October, two thousand twenty. PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ ANOWAR ULLAH, Petitioner, v. No. 18-2891 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, Chhetry & Associates, P.C., New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Carl McIntyre, Assistant Director; Nancy Ellen Friedman, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Anowar Ullah, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks review of a September 5, 2018 decision of the BIA affirming a September 6, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Anowar Ullah, No. A 201 291 844 (B.I.A. Sept. 5, 2018), aff’g No. A 201 291 844 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Sept. 6, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). “We review [the agency’s] factual findings under the deferential substantial evidence standard, treating them as conclusive unless any reasonable 2 adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Legal questions, including mixed questions of law and fact and the application of law to fact, are reviewed de novo.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, a petitioner establishes past persecution, there is a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution as well as a presumption “that internal relocation would not be reasonable.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1), (3)(ii). These presumptions may be rebutted if the government proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that internal relocation is, in fact, reasonable. Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (ii). This is a two-step inquiry that requires the agency to consider (1) whether there is a safe ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals