UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 18-4573 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RICHARD A. WELLBELOVED-STONE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon, Senior District Judge. (3:17-cr-00014-NKM-1) Submitted: February 28, 2019 Decided: June 13, 2019 Before AGEE, Circuit Judge, TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Senior Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Frederick T. Heblich, Jr., Interim Federal Public Defender, Lisa M. Lorish, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew S. Miner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Leslie Williams Fisher, Daniel N. Lerman, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Thomas T. Cullen, United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, Nancy S. Healey, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM Richard Wellbeloved-Stone pled guilty, pursuant to a conditional guilty plea agreement, to production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e) (2012). In his plea agreement Wellbeloved-Stone reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment and his motions to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) summonses and during a search of his residence. We affirm. Wellbeloved-Stone contends that the district court should have dismissed the indictment against him because application of the federal child pornography statutes ∗ to him exceeded Congress’ power under U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (“the Commerce Clause”). “We review a district court’s legal conclusions with respect to a motion to dismiss the indictment de novo.” United States v. Kaixiang Zhu, 854 F.3d 247, 253 (4th Cir. 2017). Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct . . . [commits a federal offense] if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Wellbeloved-Stone acknowledges our longstanding precedent upholding the constitutionality of the child pornography statutes as consistent with Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. See Forest v. United States, 429 F.3d 73, 78-79 (4th Cir. 2005). He argues, however, that, after the Supreme Court’s decision in ∗ In addition to production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), the indictment also charged Wellbeloved-Stone with possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2) (2012). 2 National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (“NFIB”), 567 U.S. 519 (2012), the movement in interstate or foreign commerce of the device used to produce or transmit the offending visual depiction is no longer a sufficient basis for jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause. However, we recently affirmed ...
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