Lucero Pina v. Garland

20-3348-ag Lucero Pina v. Garland UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 27th day of January, two thousand twenty-three. PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judges. JUAN JOSE LUCERO PINA, Petitioner, 20-3348-ag v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL Respondent. FOR PETITIONER: Reuben S. Kerben, Kerben Law Firm, P.C., Kew Gardens, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Anthony C. Payne, Assistant Director; Jennifer A. Bowen, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order is DISMISSED. Petitioner Juan Jose Lucero Pina, a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of a decision by the BIA (1) adopting and affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to deny cancellation of removal and (2) denying his motion to remand. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. Where, as here, “the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ and merely supplements the IJ’s decision . . . we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA.” Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The IJ in Lucero Pina’s case denied his application for cancellation of removal because he did not show that his removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative, his daughter Wendi. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The BIA agreed. Our jurisdiction to review the affirmance of a denial of cancellation of removal due to an applicant’s failure to satisfy § 1229b’s hardship requirement is limited to colorable constitutional claims or questions of law, which we review de novo. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D); Barco- Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2008); Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767, 772 (2d Cir. 2009). Questions of law may include the application of law to undisputed facts. See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1070 (2020). They may also arise where the BIA “totally overlooked” or “seriously mischaracterized” evidence, Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 2009), or applied “a legally erroneous standard,” Xiao Ji Chen v. …

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