Memon v. Blinken


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ABDULLAH MEMON, et al. Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 22-0754 (CKK) ANTONY J. BLINKEN, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION (February 1, 2023) As the State Department faces a substantial backlog of visa applications, lawsuits to speed review have become legion in this jurisdiction. Like most, Plaintiffs in this action ask to cut the line in front of less fortunate applicants without the means to secure counsel. Because Plaintiffs plead no plausible facts warranting such inequitable relief, the Court shall GRANT Defendant’s [10] Motion to Dismiss. The Court assumes the reader’s familiarity with the process and statutory background for visa applications broadly. The Court takes the following facts, to the extent they are plausible, as true for the purposes of resolving the pending Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014). On December 11, 2019, Plaintiffs Abdullah Memon, Fatimah Memon, Muhammad Tayyab Memon, Javeriah Memon, and Mariah Memon applied for visas to enter the United States, sponsored by their mother and lawful permanent resident Plaintiff Khair Memon. Am. Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 5. Their applications have been pending at the State Department’s National Visa Center (“NVC”) since June 3, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. To date, the NVC has not forwarded their applications to a consular 1 officer for interview(s) at the United States Embassy, Islamabad. See id. ¶ 10. As such, the time elapsed between submission to now is approximately 34 months. Plaintiffs insist that Defendant, therefore, has not adjudicated their applications “within a reasonable time” as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) and that the Court must “compel [that] agency action [as] unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” Id. § 706(1). Plaintiffs also press a claim under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which is subject to the same standard applied to claims under § 706(1) of the APA. Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 152 (D.D.C. 2017). Although a court may order an agency “to perform a [mandatory] act, [i.e.,] to take action upon a matter,” a court may not decide “how [the agency] shall act.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 62 (2004). Here, there is no real allegation that Defendant has simply refused to act entirely. Rather, Plaintiffs insist that “Defendant has failed to complete his duties within a reasonable time.” Am. Compl. at 18. To determine whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that agency action has been “unreasonably delayed,” the Court applies the familiar “TRAC” factors laid out in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984): (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme …

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