Monir Ahmmed v. Attorney General United States of America

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 23-1084 ___________ MONIR AHMMED, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ___________ On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (A208-991-394) Immigration Judge: Charles M. Honeyman ___________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) October 17, 2023 ____________ Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PHIPPS, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges. (Filed: October 26, 2023 ) ___________ OPINION* ___________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. Monir Ahmmed, a citizen of Bangladesh, who entered the United States on May 6, 2016, without inspection or parole, petitions to challenge the denial of his requests for relief from removal. During the removal proceedings, Ahmmed conceded removability but sought withholding of removal, asylum, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. He based those claims on the assertion that the Bangladesh Awami League, a majority party in Bangladesh, persecuted him because he was an official for a minority party, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal. But this case does not turn on facts related to political violence in Bangladesh. Instead, it hinges on Ahmmed’s credibility – or lack thereof. The Immigration Judge found that Ahmmed was not credible, and without affording any weight to his testimony, determined that the remaining evidence did not satisfy Ahmmed’s burden of proof for his requested relief. On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld that conclusion and issued a final removal order. Ahmmed timely invoked this Court’s jurisdiction to review that order, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and in reviewing the agency’s adverse credibility finding under the substantial evidence standard, we will deny his petition. When evaluating witness testimony, an Immigration Judge may give weight to any inconsistency, even one that does not go to the core of an applicant’s claim. Alimbaev v. Att’y Gen., 872 F.3d 188, 196–97 (3d Cir. 2017); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (asylum); 8 US.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (withholding of removal). While an Immigration Judge may not give undue weight to “insignificant testimonial inconsistencies,” the Immigration Judge is “normally in the best position to make credibility determinations.” Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2005). For perspective, an adverse credibility finding is not the same as a finding of perjury or willful misrepresentation; it means only that the 2 witness is not believable in whole or in part. See Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1681 (2021) (explaining that a witness may lack credibility for reasons other than lying, such as when the testimony is “not ‘worthy of belief’” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 448 (10th ed. 2014))); cf. Nunez v. Att’y Gen., 35 F.4th 134, 142 (3d Cir. 2022) (upholding an adverse credibility determination based on finding “self-serving” testimony). The substantial evidence standard governs judicial review of agency findings of fact, including adverse credibility findings. See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that adverse …

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