Nevel Heslop v. Attorney General United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________ No. 22-1104 ____________ NEVEL LAREY HESLOP, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ____________ On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (A038-582-748) Appellate Immigration Judge: Earle B. Wilson ____________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) (November 17, 2022) Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. (Filed: November 30, 2022) ____________ OPINION ____________  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. Nevel Larey Heslop petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We will deny the petition. I Heslop is a native and citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1984. In 1991, he was convicted in New Jersey of murdering his wife after he stabbed her in a barber shop. The next year Heslop was placed in removal proceedings because his conviction was an aggravated felony. An immigration judge issued an order of deportation in 1996 after denying Heslop a waiver of inadmissibility under former INA § 212(c). In 2011 and 2013, while Heslop was still incarcerated in the United States, his family stated they had received threats against his life made by the family of his late wife and an unknown person. In 2013, Heslop petitioned for review of his order of removal with this Court, which we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We notified Heslop that his claims relating to changed circumstances in Jamaica had to be presented to the agency first. In 2021, Heslop petitioned to reopen his removal proceedings under the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture. The BIA denied the petition, holding it was untimely and that no exception applied. Heslop filed this petition for review. 2 II1 Heslop’s petition to reopen was not filed within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative order as required by regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). To avoid that time bar, Heslop claims circumstances in Jamaica have changed since his deportation order was entered in 1996. See Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 108, 110–11 (3d Cir. 2017). A Heslop cites death threats against him, and his fear that the family and former partner of his late wife, whom he alleges have ties to the Jamaican government, will try to kill him. Though its opinion is not a model of clarity, the BIA assumed that these circumstances suffice to establish changed country conditions and proceeded to evaluate Heslop’s prima facie eligibility for CAT protection. App. 13–14. Heslop claims the BIA erred when it applied the incorrect standard for establishing prima facie eligibility for relief. He is correct. Motions to reopen must show a “reasonable likelihood” that the movant can establish entitlement to relief under CAT in a reopened proceeding. Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). This standard is less …

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