Pomaquiza-Pomaquiza v. Garland

20-748 Pomaquiza-Pomaquiza v. Garland BIA Leeds, IJ A206 188 534 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of August, two thousand twenty-two. PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ WILSON ORLANDO POMAQUIZA-POMAQUIZA, Petitioner, v. 20-748 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Kevin E. Dehghani, Esq., New Haven, CT. FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Anthony C. Payne, Assistant Director; Liza S. Murcia, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Wilson Orlando Pomaquiza-Pomaquiza, a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of a February 13, 2020, decision of the BIA, dismissing his appeal of a June 18, 2018, decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Wilson Orlando Pomaquiza-Pomaquiza, No. A 206 188 534 (B.I.A. Feb. 13, 2020), aff’g A206 188 534 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. June 18, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. We review the BIA’s decision. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). 1 We review the denial of a 1 We do not reach Pomaquiza-Pomaquiza’s argument concerning the IJ’s acceptance of DHS’s opposition because the BIA did not consider that opposition or adopt the IJ’s decision. In any event, remand would be futile because the BIA denied reopening based on Pomaquiza-Pomaquiza’s failure to 2 motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008). “[T]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [the movant] . . . must allege facts sufficient to show 1) that competent counsel would have acted otherwise, and 2) that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance.” Rabiu v. INS, 41 F.3d 879, 882 (2d Cir. 1994) (quotation marks omitted). A movant arguing that he was prejudiced by former counsel’s failure to file an application for relief “must make a prima facie showing that he would have been eligible for the relief and that he could …

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